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ENHANCING DIVERSITY IN AN APPOINTIVE
SYSTEM OF SELECTING JUDGES
Leo M. Romero*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Any system for selecting judges must be legitimate, and it will
not be perceived as legitimate if it excludes certain members of the
bar or if it makes it difficult for different groups to get its members
on the bench. For an appointive system1 to be perceived as legitimate, it must ensure that diversity is considered in nominating candidates and in appointing judges. This Article will examine the
different measures that states, with a particular focus on New Mexico, have adopted in order to enhance diversity in their appointive
systems and then propose ways to structure an appointive system
that gives due consideration to concerns about diversity. This Article concludes that an appointive system should be designed to require consideration of diversity in the composition of nominating
commissions and in the evaluation of applicants. In addition, an
appointive system should include provisions that make the process
transparent, so that it can be monitored to see if the process is fair
in providing lawyers from all minorities and genders a fair chance
of becoming a judge. Finally, the system must provide for account* Regents’ Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law
(“UNM”). As dean of the UNM School of Law from 1991 to 1997, the author served
as chair of all judicial nominating commissions in the state of New Mexico. The New
Mexico Constitution names the dean of the Law School as the chair of the commissions, including the appellate nominating commission for the supreme court and the
court of appeals, as well as every district court in the state. See N.M. CONST. art. VI,
§ 35. The author wishes to express his appreciation for the research assistance provided by Barbara Lah, Research Librarian at the UNM School of Law, and Vanessa
Chavez, research assistant for Barbara Lah.
1. Although the appointive systems in effect in the states vary in their details, the
general features of an appointive system for selecting judges include an evaluation of
judicial applicants by a nominating commission, recommendation or nomination of a
list of applicants to the governor, and appointment by the governor limited to nominees on the recommended list. Appointive systems have been established by the voters in constitutional amendments, by legislative enactment, and by executive order.
For an example of an appointive system authorized by a constitution, see ARIZ.
CONST. art. V, § 36. For an example of an appointive system established by statute,
see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-44a (2006). For an example of an appointive system created by executive order of the governor, see Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, 1046 Mass.
Reg. 3 (Feb. 3, 2006).
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ability by providing means to ensure compliance with the diversity
and transparency requirements.
II.

DESIGNING AN APPOINTIVE SYSTEM
ENHANCE DIVERSITY

TO

Appointive systems for selecting judges necessarily must be attentive to the issue of diversity if they are to be perceived as fair.
The screening of judicial applicants by a nominating committee involves selection by a small group with little accountability, unlike
an electoral system for selecting judges where judicial candidates
subject themselves to the voters in a public election. Although the
ultimate appointment is made by the governor, an official accountable to the public, the governor’s appointment power is limited to
the list of applicants nominated by the commission. Nominating
commissions, therefore, have considerable control over the selection of judges by reason of their power to decide which candidates
can be considered for appointment by the governor. Thus, the possibility exists for an appointive system to be perceived as controlled
by a group of insiders without accountability and to be perceived as
a system that works to the disadvantage of outsiders like women
and minority lawyers, lawyers in small firms or sole practice, and
lawyers who practice outside of the urban centers of the state. Appointive systems must be designed to counter these possible perceptions and to ensure that the process is inclusive, open, and fair.
The legitimacy and credibility of the appointive system therefore
depend on the public’s faith in the fairness of the system and in the
acceptance of the system by all communities, including minority
communities.
To achieve diversity in an appointive system, the people involved
in implementing the process must be directed to consider diversity
at the different stages of the process. Diversity should be considered in appointing nominating commissions, in evaluating and recommending judicial applicants, and in appointing judges.
Although consideration of diversity does not necessarily produce a
diverse judiciary, and indeed does not require that women and minority lawyers be appointed to the bench, the consideration of diversity focuses attention on the need to have a judiciary that will
serve diverse communities and should result in a selection system
that is fair and inclusive.
Consideration of diversity in the appointive system process can
be required in several ways. First, the law establishing the appointive system can require the consideration of diversity in commis-
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sion composition and in the evaluation of applicants. Second,
nominating commissions can create their own rules that require
consideration of diversity. Third, nominating commissions or the
chair can adopt informal practices that promote diversity.
III.

DIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRED

BY

LAW

Ensuring diversity is most likely to occur when the law establishing the appointive system, whether in a constitution or statute, includes language that mandates consideration of diversity.
Mandates can also be accomplished by executive order. Diversity
language in constitutional provisions, legislation, or executive orders has the effect of valuing diversity and giving it the legal stamp
of approval. Legally requiring diversity considerations should influence the behavior of those charged with implementing an appointive system. Diversity provisions can apply to several stages in
the appointive system and can require the consideration of diversity in (1) the composition of the nominating commissions, (2) the
evaluation of candidates by the commissions, and (3) the appointment of nominees by the governor.
A.

Diversity in Nominating Commissions

A review of the appointive systems in effect in 2006 shows that
twelve states include diversity provisions with regard to the composition of commissions. Most of these provisions appear in statutes,2
but some appear in constitutions3 and three appear in executive
orders.4 The language requiring consideration of diversity varies,
with some states specifically requiring consideration of race and
gender,5 and others requiring consideration more generally of the
broad diversity of the citizenry of the state.6 One state requires
2. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12011.5(b) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 43.291(4)
(2006); MINN. STAT. § 480B.01(2)(e) (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-2(a)(3) (2006);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102 (b)(3) (2006).
3. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 36A; N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
4. See, e.g., Del. Exec. Order No. 4, 4 Del. Reg. Regs. 1310 (Feb. 21, 2001); Ga.
Exec. Order No. 06.11.03.01, 26 Ga. Gov’t Reg. 10 (Weil June 2003); Md. Exec. Order
No. 01.01.2003.12(B)(1)(e), 30:9 Md. Reg. 593 (Apr. 7, 2003); Mass. Exec. Order No.
470, § 1.1, 1046 Mass. Reg. 3 (Feb. 3, 2006).
5. See, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE § 12011.5(b) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 43.291(4) (2005);
MINN. STAT. § 480B.01(2)(e) (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-2(a)(3) (2006); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(b)(3) (2005); Md. Exec. Order 01.01.2003.12, 30:9 Md. Reg.
593; Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, § 1.1, 1046 Mass. Reg. 3 (Feb. 3, 2006).
6. See, e.g., Del. Exec. Order No. 4, 4 Del. Reg. Regs. 1310 (Feb. 21, 2001); Ga.
Exec. Order No. 06.11.03.01, 26 Ga. Gov’t Reg. 10 (Weil June 2003).
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gender balance but does not require any other types of diversity,7
and two states do not define diversity.8 A number of states also
require that nominating commissions reflect geographic diversity,9
law practice diversity,10 and political balance.11
The New Mexico judicial selection system12 provides an example
of a constitutional requirement of diversity in the composition of
nominating commissions. In the provision setting forth how the
commission members will be selected, the New Mexico Constitution states that the president of the state bar, in consultation with
the judges on the commission, shall appoint additional members of
the bar to achieve political balance on the commission and to insure that “the diverse interests of the state bar are represented.”13
7. See, e.g., Amer. Jud. Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States - Iowa, http://www
.ajs.org/js/IA_methods.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
8. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 36A (“reflecting the diversity of the population of the state”); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (mandating that “diverse interests [of
the state bar] are represented”).
9. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8 (area representation); IOWA CONST., art.
V, § 16 (area representation); FLA. STAT. § 43.291(4) (2005) (geographic distribution);
Mass. Exec. Order 470, § 1.1, 1046 Mass. Reg. 3 (Feb. 3, 2006) (geography).
10. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (“representing civil and criminal prosecution and defense”); Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, § 1.1, 1046 Mass. Reg. 3 (Feb. 3,
2006) (“various practice areas and size of practice”).
11. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 24(2) (“no more than one-half of the commission members, plus one . . . shall be members of the same political party”); NEB.
CONST. art. V, § 21 (4) (2005) (“not more than four of the nine members shall be of
the same political party”); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (“the two largest major political
parties [shall] be equally represented on the commission”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5144(a)(2) (2006) (“not more than six of the [twelve] members shall belong to the same
political party”); STATE OF UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, MANUAL OF PROCEDURES FOR
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’NS, § V (April 24, 2000) [hereinafter UTAH JUDICIAL
NOMINATING COMM’NS MANUAL] (“not more than four members [of the eight members] of each commission may be of the same political party). Contra ALASKA
CONST. art. IV, § 8 (forbidding consideration of political balance).
12. For a fuller description of the New Mexico system for selecting judges, see Leo
M. Romero, Judicial Selection in New Mexico: A Hybrid of Commission Nomination
and Partisan Election, 30 N.M. L. REV. 177 (2000).
13. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35. The New Mexico Appellate Nominating Commission includes at least three judges, at least one non-lawyer, and at least five lawyers.
The judges include the chief justice of the supreme court, or his designee, and two
judges of the court of appeals appointed by the chief judge of the court of appeals. In
addition to the judges, the state’s leading political officials appoint six members to the
commission. The governor, president pro tempore of the senate, and the speaker of
the house of representatives each appoint two commissioners—one lawyer and one
non-lawyer. To complete the commission membership, the president of the state bar
of New Mexico, in consultation with the judges on the commission, appoints at least
four members of the state bar, representing civil and criminal prosecution and defense. The president of the state bar and the judges may appoint additional members
of the bar in order to achieve political parity and to insure that the diverse interests of
the state bar are represented. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
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The constitution does not impose a diversity requirement on any of
the other officials who appoint members of the commission (the
governor, the speaker of the house of representatives, and the
president pro tempore of the senate). The constitution also provides that the dean of the University of New Mexico School of Law
“shall be the final arbiter of whether such diverse interests are represented.”14 The phrase “diverse interests” is not defined in the
constitution and the dean, as the arbiter of diversity, is left to define the term. According to deans who have served as chair of the
nominating commission, diversity includes geography, practice
type (for example, civil, criminal, plaintiff, or defense), gender,
race, and ethnicity.15 To determine whether diverse interests of the
bar are represented on nominating commissions, the dean does two
things. First, the dean consults with the president of the state bar
to ensure that women and minority lawyers are represented on the
commissions. Second, whenever a vacancy occurs, the dean notifies the governor, speaker of the house of representatives, and
president pro tempore of the senate of the need to appoint commissioners16 and specifically reminds them to consider appointing women and minorities.
A provision that goes beyond mandating consideration of diversity by requiring a certain percentage or number of women or minority commissioners may result in equal protection challenges.
Indeed, Florida’s attempt to reserve one-third of commission seats
for women or members of a racial or ethnic minority group faced
such a challenge. A federal court invalidated the Florida law on
grounds that the 1991 statute violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.17 Florida law now requires that
the governor, who makes the appointments to the nominating commissions, ensure that to the extent possible, the membership of
14. Id. The New Mexico Constitution does not say what the dean should do, or
even what the dean can do, with regard to determining whether diverse interests of
the state bar are represented.
15. This observation is based on the author’s conversations with the fellow deans
who have served as chairs of the nominating commissions since its inception in 1989,
Theodore Parnall, Robert J. Desiderio, and Suellyn Scarnecchia (current dean and
chair).
16. Although the Constitution provides that the terms of nominating commissioners shall be set by law, N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35, the New Mexico legislature has not
enacted legislation fixing the terms of commissioners. As a result, whenever a judicial
vacancy occurs, the dean asks the appointing authorities whether they intend to retain
their commissioners or to replace them. Amer. Jud. Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the
States – New Mexico, http://www.ajs.org/js/NM_methods.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2007).
17. Mallory v. Harkness, 895 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
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each commission reflects the “racial, ethnic, and gender diversity,
as well as the geographic distribution of the population” within the
relevant jurisdiction.18
B.

Consideration of Diversity in Evaluations of
Judicial Applicants

Unlike mandates to consider diversity in nominating commissions, states for the most part do not require commissions to consider diversity when evaluating candidates and deciding whom to
recommend to the governor for appointment. States generally require only that candidates be evaluated on the basis of criteria that
do not include race, ethnicity, or gender.19 Only three states refer
to gender or minority status of the candidates when addressing the
evaluation of candidates.20 By statute, Minnesota requires that
commissions evaluate the extent to which candidates meet the criteria for judicial office and specifically provides that “the commission shall give consideration to women and minorities.”21 In
addition, this statutory provision requires commissions to “solicit,
in writing, recommendations from . . . organizations that represent
minority or women attorneys in the judicial district who have requested solicitation.”22 Alaska and Utah require the same consideration of gender and minority status at the evaluation stage, but
18. FLA. STAT. § 43.291(4) (2005).
19. For example, the evaluative criteria of Colorado, Connecticut, and Delaware
does not include consideration of gender or race as a criterion. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 51-44a(e) (2004) (listing the following criteria: legal ability, competence, integrity,
character, and temperament); CONN. JUDICIAL SELECTION REPORT, ch. 3, figures III1 and III-2 (2000), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/pri/archives/2000jsreportchap3
.htm (giving more detailed evaluation criteria); Del. Exec. Order No. 4, 4 Del. Reg.
Regs. 1311 (Feb. 21, 2001) (listing the following criteria: intellect, work ethic, temperament, integrity and ability to sensibly, intelligibly, promptly, impartially, and independently interpret the law and administer justice); RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE
COLO. SUPREME COURT NOMINATING COMM’N, Rule II G, (Adopted Aug. 29, 1979,
amended Dec. 2, 2005), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/committees/
nomcommdocs/rules/scrules.htm [hereinafter COLORADO NOMINATING COMM’N
RULES] (listing the following criteria: integrity and moral courage, legal ability and
experience, intelligence, and wisdom, deliberate and fair minded, industrious and
prompt, acceptable personal habits and outside activities, and courteous and
considerate).
20. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 480B.01(8) (2005); ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL PROCEDURES FOR NOMINATING JUDICIAL CANDIDATES § VI A, available at http://www
.ajc.state.ak.us/selection/procedur.htm [hereinafter ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING
PROCEDURES]; UTAH JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’NS MANUAL, supra note 11,
§ IX(B).
21. MINN. STAT. § 480B.01(8) (2005).
22. Id.

R
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do so by rule rather than statute.23 The Alaska Procedures for
Nominating Judicial Candidates include legal and life experience as
criteria for evaluating the qualifications of candidates and inform
candidates that the Judicial Council, as the nominating body in
Alaska, will look for broader qualities reflected in the applicant’s
life experiences “such as the diversity of the applicant’s personal
and educational history, exposure to persons of different ethnic
and cultural backgrounds, and demonstrated interests in areas
outside the legal field.”24 In the Utah Manual of Procedures for
Judicial Nominating Commissions, commissions are warned that
evaluation criteria contain some bias that may operate to the disadvantage of women and minorities and are advised to determine
how to weigh the various criteria.25 Moreover, the Manual specifically allows consideration of diversity. In a section entitled Diversity on the Bench, the Manual provides:
When deciding among applicants whose qualifications appear in
all other respects to be equal, it is relevant to consider the background and experience of the applicants in relation to the current composition of the bench for which the appointment is
being made. The idea is to promote a judiciary of sufficient diversity that it can most effectively serve the needs of the
community.26

C.

Consideration of Diversity in the Appointment of
Recommended Candidates

Only one state, Arizona, requires the governor to consider diversity when appointing a judge. The Arizona constitution requires
the governor to fill a judicial vacancy by appointing one of the
nominees submitted to him by a judicial appointment commission.
It specifically provides: “In making the appointment, the governor
shall consider the diversity of the state’s population for an appellate court appointment and the diversity of the county’s population

23. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20; UTAH
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’NS MANUAL, supra note 11, § IX B(2).
24. ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20, § VI(A).
25. UTAH JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’NS MANUAL, supra note 11, § IX(B).
This provision gives the following example: “A criterion that emphasizes a history of
professional advancement may overlook qualified women and minorities who face
greater obstacles to advancement.” Id.
26. Id. § IX(B)(2).

R
R
R
R
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for a trial court appointment, however the primary consideration
shall be merit.” 27
IV.

DIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRED

BY

RULE

A second way to ensure diversity, apart from constitutional and
legislative mandates or executive orders, would be to adopt rules of
procedure that enhance the selection of women and minorities to
the nominating commissions and increase the number of applicants
from minority groups and women. In some states, the judicial
nominating commission has adopted rules of procedure governing
the appointive process,28 and in other states the supreme court of
the state has adopted rules for the commissions.29 Of the states
that have adopted rules governing the appointive judicial selection
process,30 only a few have included diversity provisions.31 Alaska’s
rules, for example, define the criterion of legal and life experiences
to include “the diversity of the applicant’s personal and educational history [and] exposure to persons of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds.”32 Utah’s rules, likewise, address diversity and
declare that diversity on the bench is a relevant consideration in
evaluating judicial applicants.33
Addressing diversity by rule has the advantage of institutionalizing effective procedures that will survive changes in the commission members, governor, and those responsible for appointing the
27. ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 37C (2006). Another provision of the Arizona Constitution provides that “The makeup of the committee shall, to the extent feasible, reflect the diversity of the population of the state.” Id. § 36A.
28. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20; RULES
GOVERNING JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’NS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, published as appendix to N.M. CONST. art. VI [hereinafter N.M. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’NS].
29. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-812.01 (LexisNexis 2006) (In Nebraska,
the legislature required the state supreme court to promulgate the procedures of the
nominating commissions); COLO. NOMINATING COMM’N RULES, supra note 19 (Colorado Supreme Court promulgates rules).
30. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20,
§ VI(A); COLO. NOMINATING COMM’N RULES, supra note 19; STATE OF HAW. JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’N RULES (adopted by the Commission Apr. 23, 1979 with
amendments as noted pursuant to art. VI, § 4 of the Hawai’i State Constitution),
available at http://state.hi.us/jud/ctrules/jscr.htm; N.M. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL
SELECTION COMM’NS, supra note 28; UTAH JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’NS MANUAL, supra note 11, § IX(B); S.D. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL QUALIFICATION COMM’N, 1997 S.D. Sess. Laws 326.
31. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20,
§ VI(A); UTAH JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’NS MANUAL, supra note 11, § IX(B).
32. ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20, § VI(A).
33. See supra notes 23 and 25 and accompanying text.

R

R
R

R
R
R
R
R
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commission members. Those implementing the appointive system
will change, but adopted procedures should endure such changes.
Although rules may not have the same standing as legislation or
constitutional provisions, they do have many of the advantages of
law. Rules are generally published and accessible to the public and
applicants. Failure to follow them may lead to lawsuits demanding
commission compliance with the rules. Minority applicants or minority bar associations may monitor compliance with published
rules and complain publicly if commission rules are not followed or
even violated. The possibility of enforcement of the rules by courts
or of airing complaints in the public arena provides ample incentives for those implementing the appointive system to comply with
the adopted rules.
Other ways have been suggested to ensure that commissions and
their members comply with commission rules. An appointive system could designate by statute or rule an official to monitor compliance with diversity requirements: for example, New Mexico
designates the dean of the law school, who serves as chair of the
nominating commission, as the final arbiter of whether the varied
interests of the state bar are represented on the commission.34
Others who have studied appointive systems have proposed oversight of commissions by a review commission or an ombudsman.35
Accountability must be built into an appointive system if it is to
be legitimate and accepted. There must be some means by which
interested parties can challenge the decisions of the people and institutions implementing the process and have those decisions reviewed. Whether the review is by a dean, ombudsman, review
commission, or by a court, the means of review should be part of
the system.
Rules and procedures that enhance diversity fall into three categories. They range from rules requiring the consideration of diversity to procedures that involve outreach to women’s and minority
bar associations. Procedures that promote transparency in the appointive process are particularly important since they enhance the
participation of women and minority lawyers in the process.

34. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
35. See Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection Reform: The Need to
Develop a Model Appointive Selection Plan for Judges in Light of Experience, 68 ALB.
L. REV. 597, 604 (2005).
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Rules Requiring Consideration of Diversity

Diversity in Commissions: As described earlier, twelve states require consideration of diversity in the appointment of commission
members.36 If consideration of diversity is not mandated by law,
rules can be promulgated that require the authorities that appoint
commission members to consider gender, race, or ethnic diversity
in making their appointments. Although a rule framed in such a
way does not require appointment of a women or minority to a
nominating commission, the rule at least has the value of focusing
the appointing authority on the issue of diversity.
Consideration of Diversity in Evaluation of Candidates: As noted
earlier, three states presently require nominating commissions to
consider gender, race, and ethnic status as part of the evaluation of
judicial candidates.37 One state imposes this consideration by statute,38and the other two states adopted rules requiring consideration of diversity in the candidate evaluation.39 Although not
requiring the inclusion of women or minorities on the list of nominees, the rule has process value by focusing attention on diversity.
B.

Rules Requiring Outreach to Minority and Women

Rule Requiring Recruitment of Women and Minority Lawyers to
Serve on Nominating Commissions: Notice of vacancies on nominating commissions should be given to women’s and minority bar
associations. These organizations can then solicit their members to
serve on a commission and also lobby the appointing authorities to
appoint one of their members to the commission.
Rule Requiring Recruitment of Women and Minority Lawyers to
Apply for Judicial Positions: In addition to general notices of judicial vacancies, special notices should be sent to women’s and minority bar associations to communicate that the appointive system
welcomes their participation and candidacies. For example, Massachusetts requires by executive order that all advertisements of judicial vacancies shall include a statement that “the Commission
encourages applications by qualified persons of diverse gender,
race, ethnicity and experience.”40
36.
37.
38.
39.

See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
MINN. STAT. § 480B.01(8) (2005).
ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20, § VI(A); UTAH
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’NS MANUAL, supra note 11, § IX(B).
40. Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, § 3.3, 1046 Mass. Reg. 3 (Feb. 3, 2006).

R
R
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Rule Requiring Presentations Regarding the Appointive Process
at Women’s and Minority Bar Association Meetings: The chair of
the nominating commission or someone involved in the appointive
process should go to meetings of women’s and minority bar associations, both state and local associations, to describe and explain
how the appointive system operates and to answer questions about
the process. These presentations should cover the application
questionnaire, the interview process, evaluation criteria, and confidentiality rules. The presenters should encourage these associations to get involved in the process and to solicit their members to
get on commissions and to apply for judicial vacancies.
C.

Rules Requiring Transparency

A number of states have promulgated rules that make the appointive process open and transparent. The degree to which commission actions, information, and meetings are open to the public
varies. Some states require commission interviews of candidates to
be open41 while some permit the interviews to be closed to the public.42 The rules in some states allow the public access to the applicant’s questionnaire, with the exception of sensitive and highly
personal information like medical and health history,43 while
others provide that information submitted by applicants will be
confidential.44 Many states permit the commission’s deliberations
to be conducted in closed session to promote candid discussion of
the candidates.45 One state, however, has adopted confidentiality
rules that prevent disclosure of the actions of the commission and
keep important information from the public. Colorado provides
that the official actions of the commission, the names of those considered for each vacancy, and the names of nominees shall be
confidential.46
41. See, e.g., N.M. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’NS, supra note
28, § 5(B).
42. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20,
§ V(A)(2).
43. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20, § I(C);
N.M. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’NS, supra note 28, § 2(D).
44. See, e.g., UTAH JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’NS MANUAL, supra note 11,
§ 7(C).
45. See, e.g., N.M. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’NS, supra note
28, § 7(A); ALASKA PROCEDURES FOR NOMINATING JUDICIAL CANDIDATES, supra
note 20, §§ VI(B), (C).
46. COLO. NOMINATING COMM’N RULES, supra note 19, §§ II(F), (H).
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Rules that promote transparency and, therefore, support diversity in the appointive system of selecting judges, are proposed
below.
Rule Permitting Public Access to Commission Documents and
Data: The names of commission members, applicants for judicial
vacancies, and those nominated to the governor should be public
information.47 In addition, the applicant questionnaires should
generally be available for public inspection.48 Exceptions, of
course, could be created to excise confidential information, like
medical information.
Rule Requiring Open Meetings: A rule should require that commission meetings be open to the public. Notice of commission
meetings should include the date, time, place of the meeting,49 and
the agenda for the meeting.50 The rule should specify what parts of
the meeting are open to the public, and what parts will be closed,51
and provide a rationale for closing part of the meeting. 52
Rule Permitting Public Participation in Open Meetings: A rule
should permit members of the public to ask questions regarding
the process and to comment on the qualifications of the
candidates.53
Rule Requiring Public Notice of Commission Actions: The chair
should distribute to the print, radio, and television media notice of
all judicial vacancies,54 the names of the nominating commissioners, the names of applicants for the judicial positions,55 and the
names of the nominees selected by the commission for consideration for appointment by the governor.56
Rule Requiring Data Collection Regarding Diversity: Each commission should be required by rule to keep records regarding the
47. See, e.g., N.M. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’NS, supra note
28, § 2(E).
48. See, e.g., id. § 2(D).
49. See, e.g., id. § 2(C).
50. See, e.g., id. § 2(F) (providing that the agenda be sent to commission
members).
51. See, e.g., id. § 7(A) et seq.
52. For example, the rule could permit the deliberation part of the meeting to be
conducted in closed session in order to promote candid discussion of the applicants.
See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20, § VI(B).
53. See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL NOMINATING PROCEDURES, supra note 20,
§ III(B); N.M. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’NS, supra note 28,
§ 5(E).
54. See, e.g., N.M. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’NS, supra note
28, § 2(A) (providing for “the chair to announce publicly” any such vacancies).
55. See, e.g., id. § 2(E).
56. See, e.g., id. § 9.
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gender, race, and ethnic status of the commission members, applicants for judicial positions, nominees, and judges appointed by the
governor. Connecticut requires by statute the reporting of statistics regarding the race, gender, national origin, and religion of all
judicial applicants.57 Statistics provide data for measuring the success of the system in achieving diversity.
Rule Requiring Annual Reports: Each commission should be required to issue annual reports on its activities to the governor, the
supreme court, the legislature, the state bar association, local bar
associations, minority bar associations, and the public. The annual
report should include the number of judicial vacancies filled during
the year, the courts in which the vacancies were filled, the number
of applicants for each vacancy, the number of nominees for each
position, and ethnic and gender figures for commission members,
applicants, nominees, and appointees. An example of a reporting
requirement for judicial nominating commissions appears in the
Connecticut judicial selection statute.58 It requires the chairperson
of the commission to submit a report in January of each year to the
joint standing committee on the judiciary. In addition to information regarding the number of candidates interviewed and number
recommended, Connecticut requires the report to include “the statistics regarding the race, gender, national origin, religion and years
of experience as members of the bar of all such candidates.”59
Transparency in the process and in the results will go a long way
towards enhancing diversity and ensuring the legitimacy of any judicial selection system. Procedures and practices formalized by
rules that enhance transparency offer several advantages. They
provide continuity so that changes in personnel will not mean
changes in the efforts to ensure diversity. They also permit monitoring of the process by the public and interested groups like women’s and minority bar associations that may bring pressure or
lawsuits to compel compliance with the rules.
More important, a transparent process with required reporting
of statistics regarding the number of women and minorities on
commissions, in the applicant pool, and on the list of nominees provides a basis for measuring how well the appointive system has
achieved diversity. Success can be measured in part by the diversity of commissioners, but the real proof is in the number and per57. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-44a(m)(3) (2006).
58. Id. § 51-44a(m).
59. Id. § 51-44a(m)(3).
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centage of women and minority lawyers nominated for judicial
positions and ultimately appointed by the governor.
New Mexico again provides an example of how gender and minority statistics afforded an assessment of the efforts to achieve diversity in an appointive system. The New Mexico experience in the
first ten years with an appointive system shows that 27.1 percent of
the judges appointed were minorities and 24.7 percent were women.60 The percentage of women applicants over this ten year period was 25.1 percent and produced 24.1 percent of the nominees
and 24.7 percent of the appointed judges.61 Minority applicants
constituted 26.2 percent of the applicant pool and did even better.
This applicant pool produced 33.1 percent of the nominees and
27.1 percent of the appointed judges.62 Although these percentages are disproportionate to the population as a whole, they compare favorably with the state bar demographics which show that, in
1997, 19.5 percent of the New Mexico lawyers were minorities and
31.2 percent were women.63 The data cannot, of course, demonstrate that the New Mexico diversity requirement for nominating
commissions was the decisive factor that produced the favorable
results for women and minorities in the appointive system. Nevertheless, the importance of diverse interests being represented on
nominating commissions was recognized by the State Bar of New
Mexico’s Task Force on Judicial Selection. After reviewing the judicial selection process, the Task Force concluded that the efforts
of the various commissions to assure diversity were desirable. 64
Women and minorities in New Mexico have fared better under
the appointive system than they did under the previous electoral
system.65 The commission nomination and appointment system did
not operate to the disadvantage of women and minorities. The
data collected in this comparison dispelled the fears raised by opponents of the appointive system that women and minority lawyers
would not do as well as they had in the purely electoral system.66

60. See Romero, supra note 12, at 205.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See STATE BAR OF N.M.’S TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 3 (submitted
Dec. 23, 1997, and accepted and approved by the State Bar Board of Bar Commissioners on Jan. 23, 1998).
64. Id.
65. See Romero, supra note 12, at 219-20.
66. See id. at 220, Table 17.
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IMPLEMENTATION OF PRACTICES THAT
ENHANCE DIVERSITY

In the absence of legislation or rules mandating actions that enhance diversity, a conscientious commission and conscientious
chair can implement informal practices that further diversity. The
chair and commission can implement all of the recommended actions described above that promote transparency and diversity. No
legislation or rule is required to authorize a commission to keep
statistics regarding the race, ethnicity, or gender of commissioners,
applicants, and nominees. No legislation or rule is required to authorize an annual report including those statistics. No legislation
or rule is necessary to authorize dissemination of the names of
commissioners, applicants, and nominees to the public, including
minority bar associations. A chair and commission interested in
promoting diversity would have no constraints on recruiting minority lawyers as commissioners or applicants or in educating the minority bar associations about the process.
VI.

CONCLUSION

An appointive system for selecting judges must address the issue
of diversity if it is to gain the acceptance of minority communities
and the general public. Minority lawyers will not apply for judicial
positions if they perceive the process to be secret, closed, and exclusive. An appointive system that produces a non-diverse bench
will not have the support of minority communities and the public if
it appears that the appointive system of selecting judges excludes
qualified minority lawyers. A perception of unfairness in selecting
judges will undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the appointive system.
More important, an appointive system that produces a non-diverse judiciary does not serve the needs of the community. The
American Bar Association has recognized the necessity of increasing the diversity of the judicial branch.67 The number of states that
have required consideration of diversity in their appointive systems
attests to the importance of a diverse judiciary. Utah’s Judicial
Council stated that the relevancy of diversity is “to promote a judiciary of sufficient diversity that it can most effectively serve the
needs of the community.”68 Efforts to enhance diversity in appoin67. See, Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the A.B.A. Comm’n on the 21st Century Judiciary, 2003, at 60, available at www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf.
68. UTAH JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM’NS MANUAL, supra note 11, § IX(B)(2).
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tive systems and to increase transparency in the appointive process
will help achieve the important goal of diversity in our judicial system and increase the effectiveness of the judiciary in serving the
needs of our communities.

